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The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market 
Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross 
This paper describes subprime lending in the mortgage market and how it has evolved through 
time. Subprime lending has introduced a substantial amount of risk-based pricing into the mortgage 
market by creating a myriad of prices and product choices largely determined by borrower credit 
history (mortgage and rental payments. foreclosures and bankruptcies, and overall credit scores) 
and down payment requirements. Although sub prime lending still differs from prime lending in 
many ways, much of the growth (at least in the securitized portion of the market) has come in the 
least-risky (A-) segment of the market. In addition, lenders have imposed prepayment penalties 
to extend the duration of loans and required larger down payments to lower their credit risk 
exposure from high-risk loans. 
Federal Reserve Bank of st. Louis Review, January/February 2006, 88(1), pp. 31-56. 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
H omeownership is one of the primary ways that households can build wealth. In fact, in 1995, the typical household 
held no corporate equity (Tracy, Schneider, and 
Chan, 1999), implying that most households find 
it difficult to invest in anything but their home. 
Because homeownership is such a significant 
economic factor, a great deal of attention is paid 
to the mortgage market. 
Subprime lending is a relatively new and 
rapidly growing segment of the mortgage market 
that expands the pool of credit to borrowers who, 
for a variety of reasons, would otherwise be denied 
credit. For instance, those potential borrowers who 
would fail credit history requirements in the stan-
dard (prime) mortgage market have greater access 
to credit in the subprime market. Two ofthe major 
benefits of this type of lending, then, are the 
increased numbers of homeowners and the oppor-
tunity for these homeowners Lo create wealth. 
Of course, this expanded access comes with 
a price: At its simplest, subprime lending can be 
described as high-cost lending. 
Borrower cost associated with subprime 
lending is driven primarily by two factors: credit 
history and down payment requirements. This 
contrasts with the prime market, where borrower 
cost is primarily driven by the down payment 
alone, given that minimum credit history require-
ments are satisfied. 
Because of its complicated nature, subprime 
lending is simultaneously viewed as having great 
promise and great peril. The promise of subprime 
lending is that it can provide the opportunity for 
homeowners hip to those who were either subject 
to discrimination or could not qualify for a mort-
gage in the past. 1 In fact, subprime lending is most 
See Hillier (2003) for a thorough discussion of the practice of "redlin-
ing" and the lack of access to lending institutions in pmclominately 
Illinurily areas. In fuel, inlhe 1U:JUs the FudurallIuusillg Authority 
(FHA) explicitly referred to African Americans and other minority 
groups as adverse innuences. By the 1940s. the Justice Department 
had filed criminal and civil antitrust suits to stop redlining. 
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prevalent in neighborhoods with high concentra-
tions of minorities and weaker economic condi-
tions (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2004, and 
Pennington-Cross, 2002). However, because poor 
credit history is associated with substantially more 
delinquent payments and defaulted loans, the 
interest rates for subprime loans are substantially 
higher than those for prime loans. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that the 
probability of default is at least six times higher 
for nonprime loans (loans with high interest rates) 
than prime loans. In addition, non prime loans 
are less sensitive to interest rate changes and, as 
a result, subprime borrowers have a harder time 
taking advantage of available cheaper financing 
(Pennington-Cross, 2003, and Capozza and 
Thomson, 2005). The Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion of America (MBAA) reports that subprime 
loans in the third quarter of 2002 had a delin-
quency rate 5112 times higher than that for prime 
loans (14.28 versus 2.54 percent) and the rate at 
which foreclosures were begun for subprime loans 
was more than 10 times that for prime loans (2.08 
versus 0.20 percent). Therefore, the propensity 
of borrowers of subprime loans to fail as home-
owners (default on the mortgage) is much higher 
than for borrowers of prime loans. 
This failure can lead to reduced access to 
financial markets, foreclosure, and loss of any 
equity and wealth achieved through mortgage 
payments and house price appreciation. In addi-
tion, any concentration of foreclosed property can 
potentially adversely impact the value of property 
in the neighborhood as a whole. 
Traditionally, the mortgage market set mini-
mum lending standards based on a borrower's 
income, payment history, down payment, and the 
local underwriter's know ledge of the borrower. 
This approach can best be characterized as using 
nonprice credit rationing. However, the subprime 
market has introduced many different pricing tiers 
and product types, which has helped to move the 
mortgage market closer to price rationing, or risk-
based pricing. The success of the subprime market 
will in part determine how fully the mortgage 
market eventually incorporates pure price ration-
ing (i.e., risk-based prices for each borrower). 
This paper provides basic information about 
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subprime lending and how it has evolved, to aid 
the growing literature on the subprime market 
and related policy discussions. We use data from 
a variety of sources to study the subprime mort-
gage market: For example, we characterize the 
market with detailed information on 7.2 million 
loans leased from a private data provider called 
LoanPerformance. With these data, we analyze 
the development of subprime lending over the 
past 10 years and describe what the subprime 
market looks like today. We pay special attention 
to the role of credit scores, down payments, and 
prepayment penalties. 
The results of our analysis indicate that the 
subprime market has grown substantially over 
the past decade, but the path has not been smooth. 
For instance, the market expanded rapidly until 
1998, then suffered a period ofretrenchment, but 
currently seems to be expanding rapidly again, 
especially in the least-risky segment of the sub-
prime market (A- grade loans). Furthermore, 
lenders of subprime loans have increased their 
use of mechanisms such as prepayment penal-
ties and large down payments to, respectively, 
increase the duration of loans and mitigate losses 
from defaulted loans. 
WHAT MAKES A LOAN SUBPRIME? 
From the borrower's perspective, the primary 
distinguishing feature between prime and sub-
prime loans is that the upfront and continuing 
costs are higher for subprime loans. Up front costs 
include application fees, appraisal fees, and other 
fees associated with originaling a mortgage. The 
continuing costs include mortgage insurance 
payments, principle and interest payments, late 
fees and fines for delinquent payments, and fees 
levied by a locality (such as property taxes and 
special assessments). 
Very little data have been gathered on the 
extent of upfront fees and how they differ from 
prime fees. But, as shown by Fortowsky and 
LaCour-Little (2002), many factors, including 
borrower credit history and prepayment risk, can 
substantially affect the pricing of loans. Figure 1 
compares interest rates for 3D-year fixed-rate loans 
in the prime and the subprime markets. The 
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Figure 1 
Interest Rates 
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NOTE: Prime is the 3D-year fixed interest rate repo rted by the Fredd ie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey. Subprime is the average 
3D-year fixed interest rate at o r igination as calculated from the LoanPerformance data set. The Subprime Premium is the difference 
between the prime and subprime rates. 
Figure 2 
Foreclosures In Progress 
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NOTE: The rate of foreclosure in progress is normalized to 1 in the first quarter of 1998. MBAA indicates the source is the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America and LP indicates that the rate is calcu lated from the LoanPerformance ABS data set. 
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Table 1 
Underwriting and Loan Grades 
Credit history Premier Plus Premier A- B C C-
Mortgage delinquency Ox 30 x 12 1 x 30 x 12 2 x 30 x 12 1x60x12 1 x 90 x 12 2 x 90 x 12 
in days 
Foreclosu res >36 months >36 months >36 months >24 months >12 months >1 day 
Bankruptcy, Chapter 7 Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged 
>36 months >36 months >36 months >24 months >12 months 
Bankruptcy, Chapter 13 Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Filed Pay 
>24 months >24 months >24 months >18 months >12 months 
Debt ratio 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
SOURCE: Countrywide, down loaded from www.cwbc.com on 2/11/05. 
prime interest rate is collected from the Freddie 
Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey. The sub-
prime interest rate is the average 30-year fixed-
rate at origination as calculated from the 
LoanPerformance data set. The difference between 
the two in each month is defined as the subprime 
premium. The premium charged to a subprime 
borrower is typically around 2 percentage points. 
It increases a little when rates are higher and 
decreases a little when rates are lower. 
From the lender's perspective, the cost of a 
subprime loan is driven by the loan's termination 
profile. 2 The MBAA reports (through the MBAA 
delinquency survey) that 4.48 percent of subprime 
and 0.42 percent of prime fixed-rate loans were 
in foreclosure during the third quarter of 2004. 
According to LoanPerformance data, 1.55 percent 
of fixed-rate loans were in foreclosure during the 
same period. (See the following section "Evolution 
of Subprime Lending" for more details on the 
differences between these two data sources.) 
Figure 2 depicts the prime and subprime loans 
in foreclosure from 1998 to 2004. For comparison, 
the rates are all normalized to 1 in the first quarter 
of 1998 and only fixed-rate loans are included. 
The figure shows that foreclosures on prime 
loans declined slightly from 1998 through the 
third quarter of 2004. In contrast, both measures 
of subprime loan performance showed substan-
The termination profile determines the likelihood that the borrower 
will either prepay or default on the loan. 
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tial increases. For example, from the beginning 
of the sample to their peaks, the MBAA meas-
ure increased nearly fourfold and the 
LoanPerformance measure increased threefold. 
Both measures have been declining since 2003. 
These results show that the performance and ter-
mination profiles for subprime loans are much 
different from those for prime loans, and after 
the 2001 recession it took nearly two years for 
foreclosure rates to start declining in the sub-
prime market. It is also irnporLClHL Lo HoLe LhaL, 
after the recession, the labor market weakened 
but the housing market continued to thrive (high 
volume with steady and increasing prices). There-
fore, there was little or no equity erosion caused 
by price fluctuations during the recession. It 
remains to be seen how subprime loans would 
perform if house prices declined while unemploy-
ment rates increased. 
The rate sheets and underwriting matrices 
from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (download 
from www.cwbc.com on 2/11/05), a leading lender 
and servicer of prime and subprime loans, provide 
some details typically used to determine what 
type of loan application meets subprime under-
writing standards. 
Countrywide reports six levels, or loan 
grades, in its B&C lending rate sheet: Premier Plus, 
Premier, A-, B, C, and C-. The loan grade is deter-
mined by the applicant's mortgage or rent payment 
history, bankruptcies, and total debt-to-income 
ratio. Table 1 provides a summary of the four 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 
Table 2 
Underwriting and Interest Rates 
LTV 
loan grade Credit score 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Premier Plus 680 5.65 5.75 5.80 5.90 7.50 
660 5.65 5.75 5.85 6.00 7.85 
600 5.75 5.80 5.90 6.60 8.40 
580 5.75 5.85 6.00 6.90 8.40 
500 6.40 6.75 7.90 
Premier 680 5.80 5.90 5.95 5.95 7.55 
660 5.80 5.90 6.00 6.05 7.90 
600 5.90 5.95 6.05 6.65 8.45 
580 5.90 6.00 6.15 6.95 
500 6.55 6.90 8.05 
A- 680 
660 6.20 6.25 6.35 6.45 
600 6.35 6.45 6.50 6.70 
580 6.35 6.45 6.55 7.20 
500 6.60 6.95 8.50 
B 680 
660 6.45 6.55 6.65 
600 6.55 6.60 6.75 
580 6.55 6.65 6.85 
500 6.75 7.25 9.20 
C 680 
660 
600 6.95 7.20 
580 7.00 7.30 




580 7.40 7.90 
500 8.10 9.80 
NOTE: The first three yea rs a re a t a fixe d inte res t rate, and the re is a three-year prepayment p e na lty. 
SOURCE: Countrywide Cali fornia B&C Rate Sheet, downloaded from www.cwbc.com o n 2/11 lOS . 
underwriting requirements used to determine 
the loan grade. For example, to qualify for the 
Premier Plus grade, the applicant may have had 
no mortgage payment 30 days or more delinquent 
in the past year (0 x 30 x 12). The requirement is 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW 
slowly relaxed for each loan grade: the Premier 
grade allows one payment to be 30-days delin-
quent; the A- grade allows two payments to be 
30-days delinquent; the B grade allows one pay-
ment to be 50-days delinquent; the C grade allows 
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one payment to be 90-days delinquent; and the 
C- grade allows two payments to be 90-days 
delinquent. The requirements for foreclosures 
are also reduced for the lower loan grades. For 
example, whereas the Premier Plus grade stipu-
lates no foreclosures in the past 36 months, the 
C grade stipulates no foreclosures only in the past 
12 months, and the C- grade stipulates no active 
foreclosures. For most loan grades, Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 bankruptcies typically must have been 
discharged at least a year before application; 
however, the lowest grade, C-, requires only that 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies have been discharged 
and Chapter 13 bankruptcies at least be in repay-
ment. However, all loan grades require at least a 
50 percent ratio between monthly debt servicing 
costs (which includes all outstanding debts) and 
monthly income. 
Loan grade alone does not determine the cost 
of borrowing (that is, the interest rate on the loan). 
Table 2 provides a matrix of credit scores and 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio requirements that deter-
mine pricing of the mortgage within each loan 
grade for a 3D-year loan with a 3-year fixed interest 
rate and a 3-year prepayment penalty. For exam-
ple, loans in the Premier Plus grade with credit 
scores above 680 and down payments of 40 per-
cent or more would pay interest rates of 5.65 
percentage points, according to the Countrywide 
rate sheet for California. As the down payment 
gets smaller (as LTV goes up), the interest rate 
increases. For example, an applicant with the 
same credit score and a 100 percent LTV will be 
charged a 7.50 interest rate. But, note that the 
interest rate is fairly stable until the down pay-
ment drops below 10 percent. At this point the 
lender begins to worry about possible negative 
equity positions in the near future due to appraisal 
error or price depreciation. 
It is the combination of smaller down pay-
ments and lower credit scores that lead to the 
highest interest rates. In addition, applicants in 
lower loan grades tend to pay higher interest rates 
than similar applicants in a higher loan grade. 
This extra charge reflects the marginal risk asso-
ciated with missed mortgage payments, foreclo-
sures, or bankruptcies in the past. The highest rate 
36 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 
quoted is 9.8 percentage points for a C- grade loan 
with the lowest credit score and a 30 percent down 
payment. 
The range of interest rates charged indicates 
that the subprime mortgage market actively price 
discriminates (that is, it uses risk-based pricing) 
on the basis of multiple factors: delinquent pay-
ments, foreclosures, bankruptcies, debt ratios, 
credit scores, and LTV ratios. In addition, stipu-
lations are made that reflect risks associated with 
the loan grade and include any prepayment penal-
ties, the length of the loan, the flexibility of the 
interest rate (adjustable, fixed, or hybrid), the lien 
position, the property type, and other factors. 
The lower the grade or credit score, the 
larger the down payment requirement. This 
requirement is imposed because loss severities 
are strongly tied to the amount of equity in the 
home (Pennington-Cross, forthcoming) and price 
appreciation patterns. 
As shown in Table 2, not all combinations of 
down payments and credit scores are available 
to the applicant. For example, Countrywide does 
not provide an interest rate for A- grade loans 
with no down payment (LTV = 100 percent). 
Therefore, an applicant qualifying for grade A-
but having no down paymenllllusloe rejecled. 
As a result, subprime lending rations credit 
through a mixture of risk-based pricing (price 
rationing) and minimum down payment require-
ments, given other risk characteristics (nonprice 
rationing). 
In summary, in its simplest form, what makes 
a loan subprime is the existence of a premium 
above the prevailing prime market rate that a 
borrower must pay. In addition, this premium 
varies over time, which is based on the expected 
risks of borrower failure as a homeowner and 
default on the mortgage. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBPRIME 
LENDING 
It was not until the mid- to late 1990s that the 
strong growth of the subprime mortgage market 
gained national attention. Immergluck and Wiles 
(1999) reported that more than half of subprime 
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Table 3 
Total Originations-Consolidation and Growth 
Total B&C Top 25 B&C Top 25 B&C 
originations originations market share Total market share 
Year (bill ions) (billions) of B&C originations of total 
1995 $65.0 $25.5 39.3% $639.4 10.2% 
1996 $96.8 $45.3 46.8% $785.3 12.3% 
1997 $124.5 $75.1 60.3% $859.1 14.5% 
1998 $150.0 $94.3 62.9% $1,450.0 10.3% 
1999 $160.0 $105.6 66.0% $1,310.0 12.2% 
2000 $138.0 $102.2 74.1 % $1,048.0 13.2% 
2001 $173.3 $126.8 73.2% $2,058.0 8.4% 
2002 $213.0 $187.6 88.1 % $2,680.0 7.9% 
2003 $332.0 $310.1 93.4% $3,760.0 8.8% 
SOURCE: Inside B&C Lending. Individual firm data are from Inside B&C Lending and a re genera lly based on secu rity issuance or 
previously reported data. 
refinances 3 originated in predominately African-
American census tracts , whereas only one tenth 
of prime refinances originated in predominately 
African-American census tracts. Nichols , 
Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2005) found that 
credit-constrained borrowers with substantial 
wealth are most likely to finance the purchase of 
a home by using a subprime mortgage. 
The growth of subprime lending in the past 
decade has been quite dramatic. Using data 
reported by the magazine Inside B&C Lending, 
Table 3 reports that total subprime or B&C origina-
tions (loans) have grown from $65 billion in 1995 
to $332 billion in 2003. Despite this dramatic 
growth , the market share for subprime loans 
(referred to in the table as B&C) has dropped from 
a peak of 14.5 percent in 1997 to 8.8 percent in 
2003. During this period, homeowners refinanced 
existing mortgages in surges 8S intnrost r8tes 
dropped. Because subprime loans tend to be less 
responsive to changing interest rates (Pennington-
Cross, 2003), the subprime market share should 
tend to drop during refinancing booms. 
The financial markets have also increasingly 
securitized subprime loans . Table 4 provides the 
A refinance is a now loan that replaces an existing loan. typically 
to take advantage of a lower interes t rate on the mortgage. 
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securitization rates calculated as the ratio of the 
total number of dollars securitized divided by the 
number of dollars originated in each calendar year. 
Therefore, this number roughly approximates 
the actual securitization rate, but could be under 
or over the actual rate due to the packaging of 
seasoned loans. 4 The subprime loan securitiza-
tion rate has grown from less than 30 percent in 
1995 to over 58 percent in 2003. The securitiza-
tion rate for conventional and jumbo loans has 
also increased over the same time period. 5 For 
example , conventional securitization rates have 
increased from close to 50 percent in 1995-97 to 
more than 75 percent in 2003 . In addition , all or 
almost all of the loans insured by government 
loans are securitized. Therefore, the subprime 
mortgage market has become more similar to the 
prime market over time. In fact , the 2003 securi-
tization rate of subprime loans is comparable to 
that of prime loans in the mid-1990s. 
Seasoned loans refe rs to loans sold into securiti es a fter thn datn of 
o rigination . 
Conventional loans ure loa ns that arc ()ligible for purchase by 
Fannie Mae and Freddi e Mac beca use of loan size and includn 
loans purchased by Fannie Mac and Freddi(, Mac, as \Null as th ose 
he ld in a portfolio or that am securitized through a private label. 
Jumbo loans are loans with loan amo unts above the governlllunt-
sponsored enterprise (convontiona l con forming) loan limit. 
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Year FHA/VA Conventional Jumbo Subprime 
1995 101.1 % 45.6% 23.9% 28.4% 
1996 98.1 % 52.5% 21.3% 39.5% 
1997 100.7% 45.9% 32.1% 53.0% 
1998 102.3% 62.2% 37.6% 55.1% 
1999 88.1 % 67.0% 30.1% 37.4% 
2000 89.5% 55.6% 18.0% 40.5% 
2001 102.5% 71.5% 31.4% 54.7% 
2002 92.6% 72.8% 32.0% 57.6% 
2003 94.9% 75.9% 35.1% 58.7% 
NOTE: Subprime securities include both MBS and ABS backed by subprime loans. Securitization rate = securities issued divided by 
originations in dollars. 
SOURCE: Inside MBS & ABS. 
Many factors have contributed to the growth 
of subprime lending. Most fundamentally, it 
became legal. The ability to charge high rates 
and fees to borrowers was not possible until the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) was adopted in 19S0. It 
preempted state interest rate caps. The Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) in 1982 
permitted the use of variable interest rates and 
balloon payments. 
These laws opened the door for the develop-
ment of a subprime market, but subprime lending 
would not become a viable large-scale lending 
alternative until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). 
The TRA increased the demand for mortgage debt 
because it prohibited the deduction of interest on 
consumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions 
on mortgages for a primary residence as well as 
one additional home. This made even high-cost 
mortgage debt cheaper than consumer debt for 
many homeowners. In environments of low and 
declining interest rates, such as the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, cash-out refinancing6 becomes 
a popular mechanism for homeowners to access 
Cash-out refinancing indicates that the new loan is larg"r than tlw 
old loan and the borrower receives the difference in cash. 
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the value of their homes. In fact, slightly over one-
half of subprime loan originations have been for 
cash-out refinancing'? 
In addition to changes in the law, market 
changes also contributed to the growth and mat-
uration of subprime loans. In 1994, for ()xampi(), 
interest rates increased and the volume of origi-
nations in the prime market dropped. Mortgage 
brokers and mortgage companies responded by 
looking to the subprime market to maintain vol-
ume. The growth through the mid-1990s was 
funded by issuing mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS, which are sometimes also referred to as 
private label or as asset-backed securities [ABS]). 
In addition, subprime loans were originated 
mostly by nondepository and monoline finance 
companies. 
During this time period, subprime mortgages 
were relatively new and apparently profitable, 
but the performance of the loans in the long run 
was not known. By 1997, delinquent payments 
and defaulted loans were above projected levels 
and an accounting construct called "gains-on sales 
One challenge the subprime industry will face in the future is th" 
need to develop business plans to maintain volume when interest 
rates rise. This will likely include a shift back to home equity 
1110rtgagcs and other second-lien I11ortgages. 
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Ameriquest Mortgage, CA 
New Centu ry, CA 
CitiFinancial, NY 
Household Finance, IL 
Option One Mortgage, CA 
First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 
Washington Mutual, WA 
Countrywide Financial, CA 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, IA 
GMAC-RFC, MN 
2001 
Household Finance, IL 
CitiFinancia l, NY 
Washington Mutual, WA 
Option One Mortgage, CA 
GMAC-RFC, MN 
Countrywide Financial, CA 
First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 
New Century, CA 
Ameriquest Mortgage, CA 
Bank of America, NC 
1996 
Associates First Capita l, TX 
The Money Store, CA 
Conti Mortgage Corp, PA 
Beneficial Mortgage Corp, NJ 
Household Financial Services, IL 
United Compan ies, LA 
Long Beach Mortgage, CA 
EquiCredit, FL 
Aames Capita l Corp., CA 
AMRESCO Residential Credit, NJ 
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 
2002 
Household Finance, IL 
CitiF inancial, NY 
Washington Mutual, WA 
New Century, CA 
Option One Mortgage, CA 
Ameriquest Mortgage, DE 
GMAC-RFC, MN 
Countrywide Financial, CA 
First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, IA 
2000 
CitiF inancial Credit Co, MO 
Household Financial Services, IL 
Wash ington Mutual, WA 
Bank of America Home Equity Group, NC 
GMAC-RFC, MN 
Option One Mortgage, CA 
Countrywide Financial, CA 
Conseco Finance Corp. (Green Tree), MN 
First Franklin, CA 
New Centu ry, CA 
NOTE: B&C loans are defined as less than A quality non-agency (private label) paper loans secured by real estate. Subprime mortgage 
and home equity lenders were asked to report their origination volume by Inside B&C Lending. Wholesale purchases, including loans 
closed by correspondents, are counted. 
SOURCE: Inside B&C Lending. 
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accounting" magnified the cost of the unantici-
pated losses. In hindsight, many lenders had 
underpriced subprime mortgages in the competi-
tive and high-growth market of the early to mid-
1990s (Temkin, Johnson, and Levy, 2002). 
By 1998, the effects of these events also spilled 
over into the secondary market. MBS prices 
dropped, and lenders had difficulty finding 
investors to purchase the high-risk tranches. At 
or at about the same time, the 1998 Asian financial 
crisis greatly increased the cost of borrowing and 
again reduced liquidity in the all-real-estate mar-
kets. This impact can be seen in Table 4, where 
the securitization rate of subprime loans drops 
from 55.1 percent in 1998 to 37.4 percent in 1999. 
In addition, the volume of originations shown in 
Table 3 indicates that they dropped from $105.6 
billion in 1999 to $102.2 billion in 2000. Both of 
these trends proved only transitory because both 
volume and securitization rates recovered in 
2000-03. 
Partially because of these events, the structure 
of the market also changed dramatically through 
the 1990s and early 2000s. The rapid consolidation 
ofthe market is shown in Table 3. For example, 
the market share of the top 25 firms making sub-
prime loans grew from 39.3 percent in 1995 to 
over 90 percent in 2003. 
Many firms that started the subprime industry 
either have failed or were purchased by larger 
institutions. Table 5 shows the top 10 originators 
for 2000-03 and 1996. From 2000 forward the list 
oftop originators is fairly stable. For example, 
CitiFinancial, a member of Citigroup, appears 
each year, as does Washington Mutual and 
Countrywide Financial. The largest firms ldcreas-
ingly dominated the smaller firms from 2000 
through 2003, when the market share of the top 
25 originators increased from 74 percent to 93 
percent. 
In contrast, many of the firms in the top 25 
in 1996 do not appear in the later time periods. 
This is due to a mixture of failures and mergers. 
For example, Associated First Capital was acquired 
by Citigroup and at least partially explains 
Citigroup's position as one of the top originators 
and servicers of subprime loans. Long Beach 
Mortgage was purchased by Washington Mutual, 
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one of the nation's largest thrifts. United 
Companies filed for bankruptcy, and Aames 
Capital Corporation was delisted after significant 
financial difficulties. Household Financial 
Services, one of the original finance companies, 
has remained independent and survived the 
period of rapid consolidation. In fact, in 2003 it 
was the fourth largest originator and number two 
servicer of loans in the subprime industry. 
THE EVOLUTION OF SUBPRIME 
LENDING 
This section provides a detailed picture of 
the subprime mortgage market and how it has 
evolved from 1995 through 2004. We use indi-
vidual loan data leased from LoanPerformance. 
The data track securities issued in the secondary 
market. Data sources include issuers, broker 
dealers/deal underwriters, servicers, master ser-
vicers, bond and trust administrators, trustees, 
and other third parties. 
As of March 2003, more than 1,000 loan pools 
were included in the data. LoanPerformance 
estimates that the data cover over 61 percent of 
the subprime market. Therefore, it represents the 
segment of the sub prime market that is securitized 
and could potentially differ from the subprime 
market as a whole. For example, the average fate 
of subprime loans in foreclosure reported by the 
LoanPerformance data is 35 percent of the rate 
reported by the MBAA. The MBAA, which does 
indicate that their sample ofloans is not represen-
tative of the market, classifies loans as subprime 
based on lender name. The survey of lenders of 
prime and subprime loans includes approximately 
140 participants. As will be noted later in the 
section, the LoanPerformance data set is domi-
nated by the A-, or least risky, loan grado, which 
may in part explain the higher rate of foreclosures 
in the MBAA data. In addition, the demand for 
subprime securities should impact product mix. 
The LoanPerformance data set provides a host 
of detailed information about individual loans 
that is not available from other data sources. (For 
example, the MBAA data report delinquency and 
foreclosure rates but do not indicate any informa-
tion about the credit score of the borrower, down 
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payment, existence of prepayment penalties, or 
interest rate of the 10an.S ) The data set includes 
many of the standard loan application variables 
such as the LTV ratio, credit score, loan amount, 
term, and interest rate type. Some "cleaning" of 
the data is conducted. For example, in each tab-
ulation, only available data are used. Therefore, 
each figure may represent a slightly different 
sample of loans. In addition, to help make the 
results more comparable across figures, only 
adjustable- and fixed-rate loans to purchase or 
refinance a home (with or without cash out) are 
included from January 1995 through the December 
of 2004. But because of the delay in data reporting, 
the estimates for 2004 will not include all loans 
from that year. 
Volume 
Although the subprime mortgage market 
emerged in the early 1980s with the adoption of 
DIDMCA, AMTPA, and TRA, subprime lending 
rapidly grew only after 1995, when MBS with 
subprime-loan collateral become more attractive 
to investors. Figure 3 illustrates this pattern using 
our data (LoanPerformance) sample. In 1995, for 
example, the number of subprime fixed-rate mort-
gages (FRMs) originated was just slightly above 
62,000 and the number of subprime adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs) originated was just 
above 21,000. Since then, subprime lending has 
increased substantially, with the number of FRM 
originations peaking at almost 780,000 and ARM 
An additional source of information on the subprime market is a 
list of lenders published by the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) Policy Development and Research 
(PD&R). This list has varied from a low of 51 in 1993 to a high of 
256 in 1996; in 2002, the last year available. 183 subprime lenders 
are identified. The list can then be matched to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data set. The list is compiled bv examining 
trade publications and HMDA data analysis. Lenders with high 
denial rates and a high fraction of home refinances aro potential 
candidates. The lenders are then called to confirm that they special-
ize in subprime lending. As a result. loans identified as sub prime 
using the HUD list included only firms that specialize in sub prime 
lending (not full-service lenders). As a result. many sub prime loans 
will be excluded and somo prime loans will be inc! uded in the 
sample. Very little detail beyond the interest rate of the loan and 
whether the rate is adjustable is included. For example. tho existence 
of prepayment penalties is unknown-a unique and key feature 
of subprime lending. Still this lender list has proved useful in 
characterizing the neighborhood that these loans are originated 
in. See. for example, Pennington-Cross (2002) and Cal em, Gillon. 
and Wachter (2004). 
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originations peaking (and surpassing FRMs) at 
over 866,000. 9 
The subprime market took a temporary 
downturn when the total number of FRM sub-
prime originations declined during the 1998-2000 
period; this observation is consistent with our 
earlier brief history discussion and the down-
turn in originations reported by Inside Mortgage 
Finance (2004) and shown in Table 3. Since 2000, 
however, the subprime market has resumed its 
momentum. In fact, from 2002 to 2003 the 
LoanPerformance data show a 62 percent increase 
and the Inside Mortgage Finance data show a 56 
percent increase in originations. 
During the late 1 990s, house prices increased 
and interest rates dropped to some of the lowest 
rates in 40 years, thus providing low-cost access 
to the equity in homes. Of the total number of 
subprime loans originated, just over one-half 
were for cash-out refinancing, whereas more than 
one-third v'ere for a home purchase (see Figure 4). 
In 2003, fOl example, the total number of loans for 
cash-out refinancing was over 560,000, whereas 
the number of loans for a home purchase totaled 
more than 820,000, and loans for no-cash-out 
refinancing loans amounted to just under 250,000. 
In the prime market, Freddie Mac estimated that, 
in 2003,36 percent of loans for refinancing took 
at least 5 percent of the loan in cash (downloaded 
from the Cash-Out Refi Report at 
www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/data.html 
on 11/4/04). This estimate is in contrast with 
typical behavior in the subprime market, which 
always has had more cash-out refinancing than 
no-cash-out refinancing. 
Given the characteristics of an application, 
lenders of subprime loans typically identify bor-
rowers and classify them in separate risk cate-
gories. Figure 5 exhibits four risk grades, with 
A- being the least risky and D being the riskiest 
grade. 10 The majority of the subprime loan origi-
Similarly. Nichols. Pennington-Cross. ami Yezer (2005) note that 
the share of subprime mortgage lending in the overall mortgage 
market grew from 0.74 percent in the earlv 1 OOOs to almost 9 percunt 
by the end of 1090s. 
10 Loan grades arc assignod by LoanPerformanco ilnd rellect only the 
rank ordering of any specific firm's classifications. Because these 
classifications are not uniform. there will bB mixing of loan qualities 
across grades. Therefore. these categories will likely differ from the 
Countrywide examples used earlier. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
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nations in this data set are classified into the low-
est identified risk category (grade A-), particularly 
after 1998. In addition, the proportion of grade 
A-loans to the total number of loans has contin-
uously increased from slightly over 50 percent 
in 1995 to approximately 84 percent in 2003. On 
the other hand, the shares of grades B, C, and D 
loans have all declined since 2000. Overall, these 
observations illustrate that, since 1998-99, the 
subprime market (or at least the securitized seg-
ment of the market) has been expanding in its 
least-risky segment. It seems likely then that the 
move toward the A- segment of subprime loans 
is in reaction to (i) the events of 1998, (ii) the dif-
ficulty in correctly pricing the higher-risk seg-
ments (B, C, and D credit grades), and, potentially, 
(iii) changes in the demand for securities for sub-
prime loans in the secondary market. 
Credit Scores 
On average, ARM borrowers have lower credit 
scores than FRM borrowers (see Figure 6). In 2003, 
for example, the average FICO (a credit score 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW 
created by Fair Isaac Corporation to measure 
consumer credit worthiness) for FRMs is almost 
50 points lower than for ARMs (623 versus 675). 
During the 1990s, average credit scores tended to 
decline each year, particularly for ARM borrow-
ers; but since 2000, credit scores have tended to 
improve each year. Hence, it appears that sub-
prime lenders expanded during the 1990s by 
extending credit to less-credit-worthy borrowers. 
Subsequently, the lower credit quality unexpect-
edly instigated higher delinquency and default 
rates (see also Temkin, Johnson, and Levy, 2002). 
With the improved credit quality since 2000, 
the average FICO has jumped from just under 622 
in 2000 to just over 651 in 2004 (dosing in on 
the 669 average conventional FICO reported by 
Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer, 2005). As 
shown in Figure 7, lenders of subprime loans are 
increasing the number of borrowers with scores 
in the 500-600 and 700-800 ranges and decreasing 
the number with scores below 500. Specifically, 
from 2000 to 2003, the share of borrowers with 
FICO scores between 700 and 800 rose from 
approximately 14 percent to 22 percent. 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
Loan to Value Ratio (LTV) 
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Moreover, lenders have on average provided 
smaller loans to higher-risk borrowers , presumably 
to limit risk exposure (see Figure 8) . As noted pre-
viously, these changes in underwriting patterns are 
consistent with lenders looking for new ways to 
limit risk exposure. In addition, although loan 
amounts have increased for all borrowers , the 
amounts have increased the most , on average, 
for borrowers with better credit scores. Also, as 
expected, borrowers with the best credit scores 
purchased the most expensive houses (see 
Figure 9). 
Down Payment 
Figure 10 depicts average LTV ratios for sub-
prime loan originations over a 10-year period. The 
primary finding here is that down payments for 
FRMs were reduced throughout the 1990s but have 
increased steadily since. (Note that the change in 
business strategy occurs just after the 1998 crisis.) 
In contrast, over the same period, down payments 
for ARMs were reduced. On first inspection, it rna y 
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look like lenders are adding more risk by originat-
ing more ARMs with higher LTVs; however, this 
change primarily refl ects borrowers with better 
credit scores and more loans classified as A-. 
Therefore , this is additional evidence that lenders 
of subprime loans reacted to the losses sustained 
in 1998 by moving to less-risky loans-primarily 
to borrowers with higher credit scores. 
As shown in Figure 11 , this shift in lending 
strategy was accomplished by (i) steadily reducing 
loans with a large down payment (LTV ::; 70) , (ii) 
decreasing loans with negative equity (LTV > 100), 
and (iii) increasing loans with a 10 percent down 
payment. Overall, lenders of subprime loans have 
been increasing loan amounts, shifting the distri-
bution of down payments, and increasing credit 
score requirements, on average, since 2000. 
In general , borrowers with larger down pay-
ments tend to purchase more expensive homes 
(Figure 12). By tying the amount of the loan to 
the size of the down paymen t, lenders limit their 
exposure to credit risk. 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
LTV by Credit 5£ore 
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The LTV-FICO Trade-off 
In Figure 13, we ohserve that horrowers with 
the best credit scores tend to also provide the 
largest down payments. But, beyond this obser-
vation, there seems little correlation between 
credit scores and down payments. 
In contrast, Figure 14 shows a clear ordering 
of down payments (LTV ratios) by loan grade. 
Loans in higher loan grades have smaller down 
payments on average. In fact, over time, especially 
after 2000, the spread tends to increase. This find-
ing is consistent with the philosophy that loans 
identified as being more risky must compensate 
lenders by providing larger down payments. This 
helps to reduce credit risk associated with trigger 
events, such as periods of unemployment and 
changes in household structure, which can make it 
difficult for borrowers to make timely payments. 
Consistent with the loan grade classifications, 
Figure 15 shows that lower-grade loans have lower 
credit scores. Therefore, as loans move to better 
grades, credit scores improve and down payments 
decrease. 
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INTEREST RATES 
This ser:tion examines patterns in the interest 
rate that borrowers are charged at the origination 
of the loan. This does not reflect the full cost of 
borrowing because it does not include any fe es 
and upfront costs that are borne by the borrower. 
In addition , the borrower can pay extra fees to 
lower the interest rate, which is called paying 
points. 
Despite these stipulations , we are able to find 
relationships between the observed interest rates 
and underwriting characteristics. There is not 
much difference in the average interest rate (the 
interest rate on the loan excluding all upfront 
and continuing fees) at origination for FRMs and 
ARMs (see Figure 16). But, both product types 
have experienced a large drop in interest rates, 
from over 10 percent in 2000 to approximately 7 
percent in 2004. 
Underwriting standards usually rely heavily 
on credit history and LTVs to determine the appro-
priate risk-based price. In Figures 17 and 18 we 
see evidence ofrisk-based pricing based on bor-
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Figure 14 
LTV by Loan Grade 
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Figure 15 
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Figure 16 
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rower credit scores and, to some small extent, on 
borrower down payments. For example, borrowers 
with the highest FICO scores tend to receive a 
lower interest rate. In 2004, average interest rates 
vary by over 2 percentage points from the highest 
to the lowest FICO scores. 
This range of interest rates does not hold 
when pricing is based solely on down payments. 
In fact, the striking result from Figure 18 is that, 
on average, the pricing of subprime loans is very 
similar for all down-payment sizes, except for 
loans with LTVs greater than 100, which pay a 
substantial premium. One way to interpret these 
results is that lenders have found good mecha-
nisms to compensate for the risks of smaller down 
payments and, as a result, down payments in 
themselves do not lead to higher borrower costs. 
However, if the equity in the home is negative, 
no sufficient compensating factor can typically 
be found to reduce expected losses to maintain 
pricing parity. The borrower has a financial 
incentive to default on the loan because the loan 
amount is larger than the value ofthe home. As a 
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result, the lender must increase the interest rate 
to decrease its loss if a default occurs. 
Figure 19 shows the average iuterest rate by 
loan grade. The riskiest borrowers (Grade D) 
receive the highest interest rate, whereas the 1east-
risky borrowers (Grade A-) receive the lowest 
interest rate. Interestingly, although interest rates 
overall changed dramatically, the spread between 
the rates by grade have remained nearly constant 
after 1999. This may indicate that the risks, and 
hence the need for risk premiums, are in levels, 
not proportions, across risk grades. 
Prepayment Penalties 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to define 
specific examples of predatory lending, but pre-
payment penalties have been associated with 
predatory practices. A joint report by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and the U.S. Department of Treasury 
(Treasury) (2002) defined predatory lending as 
lending that strips home equity and places bor-
rowers at an increased risk of foreclosure. The 
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Figure 17 
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Figure 18 
Interest Rates by LTV 
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Figure 19 
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characteristics include excessive interest rates 
and fees, the use of single-premium credit life 
insurance, and prepayment penalties that provide 
no compensating benefit, such as a lower interest 
rate or reduced fees. In addition, some public 
interest groups such as the Center for Responsible 
Lending believe that prepayment penalties are in 
their very nature predatory because they reduce 
borrower access to lower rates (Goldstein and Son, 
2003). 
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac changed 
their lending standards to prohibit loans (i.e ., 
they will not purchase them) that include some 
types of prepayment penalties. On October 1,2002, 
Freddie Mac no longer allowed the purchase of 
subprime loans with a prepayment penalty after 
three years. However, loans originated before 
that date would not be affected by the restriction 
(see www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/ 
ppmqanda.html downloaded on 2/14/05). If a 
subprime loan stipulates a prepayment penalty, 
Fannie Mae will consider the loan for purchase 
only if (i) the borrower receives a reduced interest 
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rate or reduced fees , (ii) the borrower is provided 
an alternative mortgage choice, (iii) the nature of 
the penalty is disclosed to the borrower, and (iv) 
the penalty cannot be charged if the borrower 
defaults on the loan and the note is accelerated 
(www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2000/ 
0710.jhtml).11 Therefore, we may expect to see a 
decline in the use of prepayment penalties starting 
in 2000 and 2002, at least in part due to changes 
in the demand for subprime securities. 
Despite these concerns, prepayment penalties 
have become a very important part of the sub-
prime market. When interest rates are declining 
or steady, subprime loans tend to be prepaid at 
elevated rates compared with prime loans 
(Pennington-Cross, 2003, and DBS Warburg, 2002). 
In addition, subprime loans tend to default at 
elevated rates. As a result, the expected life of an 
average subprime loan is much shorter than that 
1 1 When a borrower dn!ilults , the lender typically will snnd an acculma-
tion note informing the borrow or Ihat tho mortgagll contract has 
been violated and all of the n ,maining ba lance and fees on th" 
loan arc due illlInediatcljr. 
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of a prime loan. Therefore, there are fewer good 
(nonterminated) loans to generate income for an 
investor to compensate for terminated (defaulted 
and prepayed) loans. One mechanism to reduce 
the break-even price on these fast-terminating 
loans is to use prepayment penalties (Fortowsky 
and LaCour-Little, 2002). Although this same 
mechanism is used in the prime market, it is not 
as prevalent. 
Figure 20 shows that, prior to 2000, the use 
of prepayment penalties grew quickly. Substan-
tially more ARMs than FRMs face a prepayment 
penalty. For loans originated in 2000-02, approx-
imately 80 percent of ARMs were subject to a pre-
payment penalty compared with approximately 
45 percent of FRMs. Equally important, the share 
of ARMs and FRMs subject to a prepayment 
penalty rose dramatically from 1995 to 2000. In 
fact, at the end of the five-year period, ARMs were 
five times more likely and FRMs twice as likely 
to have prepayment penalties. 
This rapid increase can at least partially be 
attributable to regulatory changes in the interpre-
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tation ofthe 1982 AMTPA by the Office of Thrift 
and Supervision (OTS). Before 1996, the OTS 
interpreted AMTPA as allowing states to restrict 
finance companies (which make many of the sub-
prime loans) from using prepayment penalties, 
but the OTS exempted regulated federal deposi-
tory institutions from these restrictions. In 1996, 
the OTS also allowed finance companies the 
same exemption. However, this position was 
short lived and the OTS returned to its prior 
interpretation in 2002. 
In 2003 and 2004, prepayment penalties 
declined for ARMs and held steady for FRMs. 
This was likely caused by (i) the introduction of 
predatory lending laws in many slales and cilies 
(typically these include ceilings on interest rates 
and upfront fees, restrictions on prepayment 
penalties, and other factors)12; (ii) the evolving 
position of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on pre-
12 For more details on predatory lending laws that are both pending 
and in force, the MBAA has a "Predatory Lending Law Rcsonrce 
Center" available at www.mbaa.orglresourc8s/predlend/ and the 
Law Offices of Herman Thordsen also provide detailed summaries 
of predatory laws at www.lendinglaw.com/predlendlaw.htrn. 
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 53 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 
Figure 21 
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payment penalties; and (iii) the reversed OTS 
interpretation of AMTPA in 2002 (see 67 Federal 
Register 60542, September 26, 2002), which again 
made state laws apply to finance companies just 
as they had prior to 1996. 
The share of loans containing a prepayment 
penalty is lowest among borrowers with the 
highest, or best, FICO scores (see Figure 21). In 
2003, for instance, about 20 percent of borrowers 
with a FICO score above 800 were subject to a 
prepayment penalty, whereas over 60 percent of 
borrowers with a FICO score below 700 faced 
such a penalty. 
To understand the prevalence of these penal-
ties, one must know how long prepayment penal-
ties last. Figure 22 shows that the length of the 
penalty has generally been declining since 2000. 
Again, the introduction and threat of predatory 
lending laws and Freddie Mac purchase require-
ments (that the term of a prepayment penalty be 
no more than three years) is likely playing a role 
in this trend. In addition, FRMs tend to have much 
longer prepayment penalties. For example, in 
2003, the average penalty lasted for almost three 
years for FRMs and a little over two years for 
ARMs, both of which meet current Freddie Mac 
guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
As the subprime market has evolved over the 
past decade, it has experienced two distinct 
periods. The first period, from the mid-1990s 
through 1998-99, is characterized by rapid growth, 
with much ofthe growth in the most-risky seg-
ments of the market (B and lower grades). In the 
second period, 2000 through 2004, volume again 
grew rapidly as the market became increasingly 
dominated by the least-risky loan classification 
(A- grade loans). In particular, the subprime mar-
ket has shifted its focus since 2000 by providing 
loans to borrowers with higher credit scores, 
allowing larger loan amounts, and lowering the 
down payments for FRMs. Furthermore, the sub-
prime market had reduced its risk exposure by 
limiting the loan amount of higher-risk loans and 
imposing prepayment penalties on the majority 
of ARMs and low credit-score loans. The use of 
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prepayment penalties has declined in the past few 
years because the securities market has adjusted 
to public concern about predatory lending and 
the regulation of finance companies has changed. 
The evidence also shows that the subprime 
market has provided a substantial amount ofrisk-
based pricing in the mortgage market by varying 
the interest rate of a loan based on the borrower's 
credit history and down payment. In general, we 
find that lenders of subprime loans typically 
require larger down payments to compensate for 
the higher risk oflower-grade loans. However, even 
with these compensating factors, borrowers with 
low credit scores still pay the largest premiums. 
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